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Abstract 
The Common Agricultural Policy, in 2008, reached its fiftieth birthday. It has been a 
constant presence in directing resources to the EU agricultural sector, but the means 
of channelling these resources have changed considerably in that time. This article 
charts the evolution in the principal policy instruments used and analyses the welfare 
effects of the major reforms implemented. It also analyses these changes in terms of 
the institutional context of the principal reform pressures, of international trade 
obligations and EU budget concerns. Both pressures are linked to the dominant policy 
instruments adopted initially – price support. The initial institutions, however, meant 
that whilst trade concerns did not lead to significant CAP reform, budget concerns 
did. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, changes to the institutional 
context of both trade and budget policies resulted in joint pressures forcing the EU to 
change fundamentally the way in which it delivered financial resources to farmers. 
Throughout, however, this process was never one of simple determinism: those same 
policy instruments established patterns of transfers that created vested interests in the 
status quo. The CAP must therefore be seen in the light of its institutional context and 
of endogenous vested interests to the policy. 
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The Birth of the Behemoth: an introduction to the CAP 
2008 marks the fiftieth birthday of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Although 
the policy did not begin operating until 1962, it was in 1958 that Ministers of 
Agriculture, along with representatives of farmers and the food industry met at Stresa 
in order to lay the groundwork and begin preparations for the new common policy. 
The Treaty of Rome had, in Article 39.11, set out five objectives for the CAP: 
 
• to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring 
the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the 
factors of production, in particular labour; 
• thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; 
• to stabilise markets; 
• to ensure the availability of supplies; 
• to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
 
Three principles emerged at Stresa, which became known as the three pillars of the 
CAP: a single market, enabling EC-produced goods to circulate freely between EC 
members; community preference, giving this trade priority over imports from third 
countries; and financial solidarity, providing a financial structure that shared the cost 
of the CAP across all member states. 
 
The CAP would deploy many policy instruments, but even at Stresa the primacy of 
price support was acknowledged; as was its likely external impact (Neville-Rolfe 
1984; Stead 2008). In the period between Stresa and the start of operation of the CAP, 
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the members2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had the 
opportunity to address the nascent policy during the Dillon Round (1960-62). Despite 
concerns over the consequences of high support prices, the US accepted the principle 
of price support. In return, it negotiated the side-payment of duty-free access to the 
EU market for oilseeds – CAP commodities for which EC self-sufficiency was by far 
the lowest (typically below 40% until well into the 1970s), for which the EC would 
have an ongoing import need. 
 
Price support implied the possible use of export subsidies, but these had been 
confirmed as GATT compliant (subject to limits) in 1955. The EC system of price 
support would also involve variable import levies rather than fixed tariffs. These were 
not covered by the GATT and their legality would not be challenged until the 
Uruguay Round. Ultimately, with support prices not yet set, GATT members were 
unable to determine if the CAP would leave the EC in violation of its obligations 
under the General Agreement (see also Josling et al 1996, 40). 
 
Subsequently, fears over the trade effects of the CAP would be justified, as discussed 
below. Indeed, it would be this central policy instrument of price support that would 
generate two distinct sources of pressure for reform – the EC budget and international 
trade concerns – as well as distinct beneficiaries resistant to CAP reform: landowners 
and agribusinesses. It would, however, be the institutional context of the reform 
pressures that would determine whether the interests in the status quo would be 
overcome. First, we consider the simple economics of price support to establish its 
role in the evolution of the CAP and emergence of reform pressures. 
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APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 1 
 
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of price support. The system turns the EC market into an 
economic island, wherein prices are maintained at levels above those prevailing on 
world markets: Pw is that world price, initially. Pth is the Threshold Price, a minimum 
import price maintained by the application of a variable import levy, VIL: Pth is 
fixed, but the levy varies with world price movements. The lightly shaded area ‘a’ 
represents the revenues generated by that levy, which pass to the EC budget. Over 
time, supply increases. Technological developments will contribute to this, but partly 
because of price support. Farm income support is achieved via raised prices: the more 
that can be produced and sold, the more support received. Farmers’ higher demand for 
output-enhancing technologies (fertilisers, pesticides, more efficient harvesting 
equipment, etc) and, where possible, land (but see below) is partly policy-induced. 
Agribusinesses controlling productivity-enhancing technologies thus benefit indirectly 
from the price support system and have an interest in preserving that system. 
 
As supply rises from SEC0 to SEC1, the market price falls. As supply approaches SEC2, a 
second mechanism of price support is activated. The fall in market price undermines 
the goal of income support. A system of intervention buying puts a floor in the 
market: if market prices fall too low, farmers can sell to the government at the 
intervention price, Pi. At Pi demand is perfectly elastic and support is ‘open-ended’: 
subject to minimum standards, the authorities were committed to buying whatever 
was offered for sale. Intervention was central to the output growth seen through the 
1970s and 1980s, as it guaranteed farmers both a buyer for their output and a 
minimum purchase price, regardless of market conditions. 
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 Price support imposes a cost on consumers regardless of whether the domestic market 
is in deficit or surplus, as EC prices are above world market levels. The EC budget 
faces costs through disposal of surpluses. If surplus quantities are to be exported to 
third countries but the price paid to farmers not undermined, a subsidy is needed to 
bridge the gap to PW. The total cost of export subsidies at Pi/SEC2 is shown as the 
dark-shaded area ‘b’, with the unit export subsidy Xsub. With some surplus quantities 
bought into intervention initially rather than exported immediately storage costs, not 
shown on the diagram, will also be incurred. 
 
As output continues to rise, to SEC3, surplus production and EC exports grow. These 
exports reduce the world price, to PW’, as the EC is now a ‘large’ exporter (in just a 
few years, the EC became the second largest agricultural exporter in the world). 
Moreover at the annual price-fixing, EC Farm Ministers increased institutional prices, 
seen here as an increase in the intervention price from Pi to Pi’. The large shaded 
rectangle shows two factors driving up export subsidy costs – larger surplus quantities 
and a larger per unit export subsidy, Xsub’. Storage costs also rise as more is also sold 
into intervention. The VIL gives an indication of the degree of ‘community 
preference’ built into the CAP. Even with an unchanged threshold price, rising EC 
exports depress world prices and increase the degree of preference. In practice the 
threshold price was raised as well, increasing ‘community preference’ further. 
 
What Makes a Reform Pressure Binding? 
Price support generated two sets of policy problems directly: budgetary and trade-
related. We discuss below how problems emerged in the context of Figure 1. Before 
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that, we outline the institutional contexts that help define a policy ‘problem’ and 
which first led to the possibility of reform being needed. We then explore how these 
contexts varied in the extent to which they created binding pressures for reform. We 
distinguish in the next two sections between two periods, as reforms were agreed to 
both EC budgetary and international trade institutions through the late 1980s and early 
1990s which were to affect fundamentally the impact of both on the CAP. 
 
The Initial Institutions of International Agricultural Trade Policy 
The place of agriculture in the GATT is discussed in detail in many places (see, inter 
alia, Ingersent et al 1994; Josling et al 1996). The focus here is on the institutions of 
trade policy and their enforceability (see also Kay and Ackrill 2008). Under the 
GATT, several provisions allowed challenges against domestic policies. The key 
agriculture-specific measures were Article XI – quantitative restrictions; and, most 
relevant to the CAP, Article XVI – subsidisation, especially export subsidies. There 
were also general obligations applying to all trade. Measures could be challenged that 
‘nullified or impaired’ a country’s expected benefits from its membership of GATT; 
or which caused ‘serious prejudice’ to other countries. Export subsidies were 
permitted so long as they did not give a country “more than an equitable share of 
world export trade in that product”. Fundamental problems were faced, however, in 
enforcing Article XVI, notably defining equitable market share. As a result, in the 
fifty years of the GATT Article XVI only featured in five cases. One, brought in 1958 
by Australia against France, pre-dated the CAP (it was also the only successful 
action). The other four cases were all brought against the EC and all failed to force 
policy reform (see GATT 1983; Josling and Tangermann 2003). 
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In the two cases brought against the EC sugar regime in 1978, by Australia and 
Brazil, the Panels felt unable to rule on whether EC export shares were equitable or 
not (see GATT 1979; GATT 1980). They did, however, rule against the EC on serious 
prejudice. What followed was two years of discussion, ultimately fruitless, between 
the EC and the injured parties over what needed to be done to remove the serious 
prejudice (see Ackrill and Kay 2008). In the US action against EC wheat flour 
subsidies, the Panel failed to rule on ‘equitable share’, nullification and serious injury. 
The US case against EC pasta export subsidies saw a 3-1 Panel decision against EC 
policy, but the EC blocked the adoption of the report (Josling and Tangermann 2003, 
216-218), at the height of the “Farm Wars” (Wolfe 1998). 
 
Josling and Tangermann (2003, 210-214), however, identify two Transatlantic trade 
disputes where EC policy did change – but both were concerned with domestic rather 
than export subsidies. On canned fruit (a sensitive issue, if not a core part of the CAP) 
the EC again blocked the GATT Panel report, but still agreed to make changes to the 
domestic subsidy regime. The other case, oilseeds, is discussed below. Overall, the 
institutional structures of the GATT prior to the Uruguay Round proved inadequate to 
address the concerns of other countries about the trade effects of price support by 
forcing its fundamental reform. Thus although budget crisis emerged later, it would be 
the first to force CAP reform. 
 
The Initial Institutions of the EC Budget 
It is beyond the scope of the present article to discuss in detail the complexities of the 
EC budget (see, inter alia, Ackrill 2000b; Laffan 2000). We highlight here the two 
elements most relevant to the emergence of budget problems for the CAP. The first is 
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a balanced budget rule (BBR) , introduced in the Treaty of Rome, applied to the 
budget as a whole. A ceiling is placed on total revenues available in any year, which 
defines total spending in that year. The second, dating from the 1970 Treaty revision, 
distinguishes between two types of expenditure. Compulsory Expenditure (CE) is 
“expenditure necessarily resulting from this Treaty or from acts adopted in 
accordance therewith” Article 203 (now 272); Non-Compulsory Expenditure (NCE) 
is everything else. CE is dominated by CAP guarantees. 
 
A key part of this distinction concerned expenditure control. In essence, with NCE the 
budget was set first and then allocated between competing claims. Moreover, annual 
growth was limited by Treaty mandate. With CE, once the expenditure-generating 
policy instruments were in place all resulting expenditure claims had to be met. Were 
this not the case, policy goals could be undermined. For example, limiting spending 
on intervention storage or export subsidies would see ‘excessive’ quantities retained 
on the EC market, the EC market price fall and the income-support goal of price 
support compromised. 
 
Under price support, as production and thus surpluses rose so did spending on export 
subsidies and intervention storage, pushing total CAP and EC spending towards the 
BBR ceiling. Given the definition of CE, the only way to alter the upward trajectory 
of CAP spending was to change the expenditure-generating policy instruments – that 
is, to reform the CAP. By the early 1980s the dairy sector accounted for almost a third 
of CAP spending and a quarter of total EU expenditure: it thus provided the setting 
for the first substantive CAP reform in 1984. 
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APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 2 
 
Figure 2 shows the economic impact of a production quota, introduced into a policy 
of price support. The high support (intervention) price results in excess supply. Export 
subsidy expenditures are shown as PiPwqdqs. A production quota is now introduced. 
Even with excess supply built in and neither a reduction in intervention price nor rise 
in world price, expenditure on export subsidies falls, to PiPwqdqs’. Quotas had a direct 
impact on production; important, given the budget situation. They also helped resolve 
possibly contradictory positions across member states. Countries such as Germany 
opposed reductions in support prices whereas, for example, the UK sought to contain 
budget costs. Also, no country strongly opposed quotas. The comparative static 
budget savings from a price cut would be d+e+i+f+g+j+b,3 but ongoing production 
growth – which price cuts alone could not stem – would see area a grow over time. 
 
To understand interest-group pressures over the reform process, compare the welfare 
effects of a quota and a price cut. Cutting the intervention price to Pi’ would increase 
consumer surplus by c+d. At the time, however, there was insufficient support for the 
price cuts which would benefit consumers. In contrast, price cuts would see producer 
surplus fall by c+d+e+i+f – a much larger effect on a smaller and better-organised 
lobby. Quotas would reduce producer surplus by at least f but, if quotas were 
allocated on the basis of past production and quota-trading was not allowed, this fall 
would be f+h+i (still considerably less than the loss with price cuts). Area h+i arises 
because this method of quota allocation cuts production by efficient producers and 
maintains some production by inefficient producers. Allowing quota transfer between 
producers (as happened from 1992) could eliminate the loss h+i (see Burrell 1989). 
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 Production quotas also had to be a practical solution. Virtually all milk produced on 
farms passes through dairies for processing, offering a channel for quota enforcement. 
The one regime established with production quotas ab initio, sugar, shares this 
feature: a farm-level product (sugar beet) requiring processing to obtain the principal 
consumed commodities. This makes quotas a reform option that is limited in its wider 
applicability. With dairy production and budget growth contained, attention turned to 
other commodities which were now moving into surplus and driving expenditure-
growth (as shown in Figure 3); but the specific implementation issues of production 
quotas did not see their widespread adoption for other commodities. 
 
APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 3 
 
Most reforms thus involved modest tweaks to the instruments in Figure 1 (see, inter 
alia, Ackrill 2000a for a detailed discussion). The fundamental problem with price 
support is the inherent conflict between the price levels deemed necessary to deliver 
income support and technical progress as in Article 39, and their consequences for 
output, surpluses and budget costs. Thus, given the overbearing presence of Article 39 
on policy-makers, such ‘reforms’ as were undertaken (such as ‘guarantee thresholds’ 
in 1982 and ‘stabilisers’ in 1988) adjusted prices by, typically, 3% at most. As a result 
there was no fundamental change to the production incentives offered to farmers, 
given that EC prices were far enough above world prices for cuts of 3% to do nothing 
to reduce the production incentives.4 
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Institutional Changes and Fundamental CAP Reform 
Budget concerns resulted in policy changes, but income concerns limited the extent of 
the reforms and thus their effectiveness in containing budget pressures: a new 
direction was needed for the CAP.5 Dairy quotas represented the first reform to alter a 
core element of price support (the commitment to support unlimited production). The 
period from this reform to the 1992 CAP reform, below, marks a key evolutionary 
phase in the CAP: Article 39 ensured financial transfers to farmers would remain, but 
changes to budget and trade policy institutions resulted in simultaneous budget and 
trade pressures that saw a shift to fundamentally different instruments of support. 
 
Institutional Change in International Agricultural Trade Policy 
The Uruguay Round was significant for the multiple changes made to the treatment of 
agriculture within the GATT. Whilst agriculture continues to be treated differently to 
other sectors, notably in permitting (for now) the use of export subsidies, the 
constraints on agriculture have changed fundamentally. In particular, there are explicit 
quantitative limits on the use of export subsidies and on domestic support. This makes 
breaches much easier to establish. If, for example, the limit on export subsidies is 
exceeded, this constitutes a “prima facie…case of nullification or impairment” 
(Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 3.8, emphasis in original). Problematic 
terms like “equitable share” have thus been removed. 
 
The oilseeds case noted earlier benefited from having agriculture included in the trade 
liberalisation talks. The GATT case raised two issues – national treatment (EC 
producer payments, paid via processors, put domestically produced oilseeds at an 
advantage over imports) and nullification and impairment (the expected benefit to the 
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US from the EC’s zero tariff-binding was thus reduced). Domestic reform dealt only 
with the first concern. The second was brought into the wider Uruguay Round talks 
and, in a bilateral meeting between the US and EC at Blair House in November 1992, 
the EC agreed to limit the arable area planted to oilseeds. This followed the May 1992 
CAP reform (see below) which brought cereals and oilseeds into a new arable regime. 
In this new policy context, placing a limit on oilseeds area was less threatening to EC 
arable producers, who could trade off different crops without affecting adversely the 
overall arable payments received (see also Kay and Ackrill 2008). 
 
The quantification of spending limits on domestic support was accompanied by a 
move towards its de-coupling, weakening the link between levels of production and 
support received. Cuts were required to spending on trade-distorting domestic policies 
(Amber Box policies), such as price support. Other, less trade-distorting policies, 
were grouped into either the Blue Box or the Green Box (the origins of the Blue Box 
are considered below). These differed in the extent to which they were judged to be 
trade distorting. The Green Box contains policies felt to be no more than minimally 
trade distorting, with payments not related to production or prices. Blue Box policies 
represent partial de-coupling (based on, for example, fixed areas and yields, rather 
than current values); and/or involve payments limited in total quantity (and thus 
value); and/or include measures designed to limit production (such as land set-aside). 
 
These distinctions are crucial, as agricultural support can be maintained overall, with 
Amber Box policies replaced in part or whole by less trade-distorting measures 
compatible with the Blue and/or Green Box. In the Uruguay Round, in the wake of 
the Farm Wars, other countries were putting pressure on the EC to agree a deal that 
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could only be achieved if the CAP was reformed. The grouping of policies into 
different ‘Boxes’, with spending on each treated differently, effectively pushed the 
CAP towards particular policy instruments. 
 
Institutional Change in the EU Budget Process 
1984 saw the start of an ongoing programme of policy change: Budgetary Discipline. 
The first CAP-related measure introduced was the ‘agricultural guideline’, which 
sought to limit the growth in CAP spending to the rate of growth in EC GNP. There 
was, however, no binding pressure on the Council of Agriculture Ministers (CoAM) 
to achieve this. In 1988, further reforms were agreed (see, inter alia, Ackrill 2000b; 
Laffan 2000). Notably spending plans were presented in multi-annual Financial 
Perspectives (the first was for five years; each since has been for seven). Planned 
CAP spending embedded an amended agricultural guideline which limited growth in 
CAP guarantees to no more than 74% of the growth in EC GNP. This made the 
budget process more transparent, but there remained no credible enforcement 
mechanism for CAP spending. Thus by 1992 the BBR was again threatened (Kay 
1998), a binding budgetary constraint was again faced and CAP reform was needed in 
order to alleviate budgetary pressures. 
 
The 1992 ‘MacSharry Reform: balancing trade and budget concerns 
The foregoing established how two pressures, distinct but linked intimately to the 
structures of price support, simultaneously put the CAP under pressure. Could a 
reform be found that addressed both concerns? The solution to the trade pressure 
came through the development of direct payments compensating price cuts of a depth 
previously thought infeasible – about 30% for cereals, for example. These were paid 
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per-hectare and fixed in value, calculated with reference not to current yields but a 
yield figure based on an earlier representative period (the “Olympic average” of the 
middle three values for the five years 1986-1990). A similar reform was agreed for 
beef, where fixed headage payments were agreed. 
 
However the new payments did not conform to the definition of the Green Box (a 
problem also faced by the US). As things stood, they would thus go into the Amber 
Box and be subject to further cuts, an unacceptable option especially given the efforts 
required to achieve CAP reform. Thus at Blair House the EC sought a solution that 
could form the basis of a GATT agreement and which was consistent with the new 
CAP. The resulting Accord (see Josling et al 1996; Kay 1998; Wolfe 1998) avoided 
changing the definition of Green Box policies and kept the payments out of the 
Amber Box by creating a new, Blue, Box . This was thus defined by existing policies, 
rather than it be defined and policies conform to it. The Blue Box was then placed 
inside the Green Box to protect it from cuts imposed on Amber Box policies, with 
‘credit’ given for partial de-coupling and production constraints such as set-aside. 
 
The 1992 CAP reform was thus influenced fundamentally in both its timing and shape 
by trade pressures. As already noted, however, the BBR was again under threat and 
thus budgetary factors were also important. Consider Figure 4. There are substantial 
cuts in institutional prices, but a constant world price is assumed, for simplicity.. As 
the intervention price is reduced, the EC market price falls. Offsetting this are direct 
payments. The unit value of the direct payments, 45 ECU per tonne is based on the 
new target price, Pt, and converted to a per-hectare payment in the manner described 
above. Large farmers – those who, at base yields, could produce 92 tonnes or more of 
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cereals – also had to set aside a percentage of their land (initially 15%) in order to 
qualify for the payments. This shifts the supply curve S to S’. 
 
APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 4 
 
Export subsidy costs, initially, are PiPwqdqs. After the reform they fall to Pi’Pwqd’qs’. 
Comparing actual expenditure in 1992 and 1996, as the reform was phased-in, arable 
export subsidies fell from 3.14 billion ECU to 313 million ECU – with intervention 
costs falling from 2.5 billion ECU to -46.5 million ECU.6 Total grains self sufficiency 
fell from 120% in 1990/91 to 105% in 1995/96, with total grains intervention stocks 
falling from 20.9 million tonnes in January 1993 to 1 million tonnes in January 1997. 
 
Two types of direct payment gave compensation for lower support prices and, for 
large farmers, compensation for having to set aside land. The first is shown as 
a+b+c+e+f, whilst the second is shown as g+h+j. The set-aside payment was initially 
also based on 45 ECU per tonne (Pi-Pt). During internal negotiations over the oilseeds 
deal with the US, described earlier, the member states agreed to increase the per unit 
compensation for setting aside land, to 57 ECU per tonne, for accepting the limit on 
oilseeds area: hence area j. 
 
The fall in price results in a significant rise in consumer surplus, of a+b+k+l (see also 
McCorriston and Morgan, 1998). There is also a significant fall in producer surplus, 
of a+b+c+e+g+k+l+m+n. Within this, k+l+m+n represents lost revenue from lower 
prices that is not covered by direct payments, although this is balanced against f+h+j – 
direct payments not associated with a loss in producer surplus, but which arise 
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because of the per-hectare nature of the payments. Overall, budget spending on the 
arable sector rose from about 10.4 billion ECU in 1992 to 16.4 billion ECU in 1996. 
What explains this apparently contradictory response to budget pressures? 
 
Price support costs, as seen earlier, are under constant upward pressure, with high 
prices encouraging farmers to produce more and with intervention guaranteeing a 
buyer. Direct payments, however, are fixed in value. Indeed, not only is their per-unit 
value fixed, as described above, there are aggregate eligibility limits imposed on both: 
thus total spending on direct payments is capped. Potential problems arising from the 
definition of Compulsory Expenditure are circumvented by building spending limits 
into the policy instruments. Total spending rose over the three years the payments 
were phased in, since when further growth in CAP spending has been more 
controlled, occurring as a result of further reforms or of EU enlargements. The period 
1988 to 1992 revealed the partial nature of institutional reform – the Financial 
Perspective helped the budget process, but it was only with the embedding of 
spending limits into the new CAP payments in 1992 that a credible compliance 
mechanism for the CAP spending set out therein was achieved. 
 
Agenda 2000 – a mix of old and new 
1997 marked the start of the detailed process of preparing applicants, mainly former 
Communist countries from central and eastern Europe, for membership – and also 
preparing the EU7 for this large-scale expansion. The programme, “Agenda 2000”, 
took two distinct approaches to reforming CAP support. The first continued the 
reform of 1992, reducing price support levels further and increasing direct payments 
in compensation – albeit by only 50% of the price cut (see Ackrill 2000a, 126), 
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 The second element saw significant changes made to ‘guidance’ measures. The CAP 
has long devoted funds (albeit typically less than 5%) to restructuring measures, such 
as efficiency-enhancing ‘development plans’, early retirement for older farmers, 
training and re-training (for those wishing, respectively, to remain in or leave 
farming). In 1988 the Commission published “The Future of Rural Society” followed 
up, in 1996, by the “Cork Declaration for a Living Countryside”. This spoke, for 
example, of prioritising integrated and inter-disciplinary policies to enhance wider 
rural development and the sustainability of landscapes, through a coherent and simple 
approach to policy programming. 
 
Agenda 2000 thus established a new strand of measures – Rural Development – that 
soon became known as Pillar II (Pillar I being price and income support: CAP 
‘guarantees’). This embodied two broad concepts: the ‘European Model of 
Agriculture’ (EMA), recognising the ‘multifunctionality’ of the sector. The measures 
covered investment in farm businesses, human resources, support for less favoured 
areas and areas subject to environmental constraints, forestry, processing and 
marketing of products, agri-environmental measures, and the general development of 
rural areas. Novel features included member states choosing which measures to 
implement. Furthermore, along with an increase in the share of total CAP spending 
devoted to these measures, to about 10%, they also entailed national co-funding. This 
enabled higher total spending without imposing the full burden on the EU budget. 
 
The creation of Pillar II was not solely budget-driven,. Issues such as BSE increased 
awareness of a policy and sector that did not always deliver either production systems 
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or food of the expected safety and quality. Also, the Uruguay Round Agreement 
required that further negotiations should start on agriculture by 1999. Developing 
Pillar II meant the EU could provide resources to agriculture that reflected wider 
policy concerns and which could go into the Green Box of de-coupled measures. This 
would protect these transfers from future reductions and would allow it to take more 
of a leadership role in talks, compared with the Uruguay Round, when it was typically 
having to respond to policy initiatives led by other countries. 
 
This reform again raised budgetary concerns, in particular given the changes to Pillar 
I and with forthcoming enlargement. A new Financial Perspective (for 2000-2006) 
was also negotiated as part of Agenda 2000 wherein, for the first time, the overall 
ceiling on the EU budget remained unchanged, at 1.27% of GNP, enlargement 
notwithstanding. This marks the point when the net contributors to the EU budget 
became more assertive in EU budget negotiations. Prior to 1999, some member states 
even argued that since the post-1992 payments represented ‘compensation’ for price 
cuts not faced by the applicants, they should not receive those payments. The 1999 
reform, however, embedded direct payments as a key basis of CAP support. Denying 
new members these payments was thus infeasible politically. 
 
That said, a radical CAP reform that reduced individual EU15 countries’ receipts and 
distributed more money to the new member states was unpalatable. Thus detailed 
discussions over accommodating CAP spending in the new members – especially the 
direct payments – was deferred until October 2002, when the accession package was 
finalised. No adjustment was made to the Financial Perspective, despite an actual 
enlargement of ten countries rather than the planned six, but one part of the solution to 
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the direct payments problem was in-built: the per hectare value of arable payments 
would generally be lower in the new members because most had lower yields. It was 
also decided (by the EU15) that the payments would be phased in over ten years, 
starting at 25% of their full values. Although enlargement could have seen the budget 
again force CAP reform, reformed budgetary institutions and the more aggressive 
negotiating stance of the net contributors saw established budget constraints respected 
and any necessary financial accommodation borne by the new members. 
 
The Mid-Term Review – Anticipating Trade Pressures 
Agenda 2000 required the reformed CAP to be reviewed in 2002. Despite opposition 
from some quarters Commissioner Franz Fischler produced reform proposals, 
primarily trade-driven, that sought significant change. The post-1992 payments 
would, subject to limited exceptions available to member states, be replaced by a 
‘single payment system’. Eligibility would be independent of current activities, de-
coupling further the post-1992 payments and making them Green Box-compatible. 
This, as with Pillar II, would strengthen the EU negotiating position in the ongoing 
Doha talks. This reform is analysed by Alan Swinbank (see this volume) and is not 
discussed further here. In conclusion, however, Figure 5 indicates how far the CAP 
reforms described here have restructured overall CAP spending by policy instrument. 
 
APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 5 
 
The Making of CAP Reforms 
The foregoing reveals both the Council (the member states) and Commission as key 
players in CAP reforms. This section considers this further, although a full analysis of 
 19
Pr -Pr
t
theories of policy-making is beyond the scope of the present article (see, inter alia, 
Swinnen 1994; Van der Zee 1997; Wallace, Wallace and Pollack 2005; Pokrivcak et 
al 2006) It is a feature of EU decision-making that only the Commission can formally 
propose legislation, although the genesis of policy ideas may be elsewhere (see 
Princen 2007). 
 
CAP reforms tend to occur at times of budget or trade pressures. Article 211 of the 
Treaty (formerly 155) gives the Commission the task of ensuring the provisions of the 
Treaty are applied; including the balanced budget rule (Article 268, formerly 199). 
Moreover, in trade talks, the Commission negotiates on behalf of the member states, 
albeit to a mandate determined by the latter. This makes the Commission uniquely 
well placed to understand the pressures, budget or trade, that the CAP may face. 
Indeed, even if a reform appears to occur without immediate trade pressure, such as in 
1999 and 2003, the reforms agreed offer two advantages: greater EU control over the 
reform agenda, rather than responding to external pressures; and shaping the CAP to 
allow the EU to take more of a leadership role in trade talks. 
 
Subsequent to the Blair House Accord, some member states sought the ‘renegotiation’ 
of an agreement they said went beyond the Commission’s negotiating mandate, when 
they reached agreement on export subsidisation, domestic subsidisation and market 
access separately. The revised agreement, agreed immediately prior to the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round talks, tweaked elements of the earlier deal but left this central 
element unaffected. This outcome can be understood in the light of two factors. First, 
the move was primarily about re-imposing Council (ie member state) authority over 
the Commission. Second, the external constraints on the EU prevented reversal of this 
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element without collapsing the entire Uruguay Round. Indeed, this helps explain why 
member states have limited scope to amend the Commission’s CAP reform proposals 
generally, if reform occurs under specific pressures. 
 
Vahl (1997) analyses the policy leadership role of the Commission during the 
Uruguay Round, but his conclusions apply generally (pages 286-291). “The 
Commission can play a leading role in EC decision-making only if”: “it has exclusive 
powers at its disposal”; “Commission disunity is limited”; “it has the support of at 
least two large member states”; and “external pressure undermines the position of the 
most reluctant member state”. Not all cases fit exactly into these terms – the 1992 
CAP reform proposals were prepared in secret in the agriculture Directorate General 
partly to limit negative influence from within the Commission (Kay 1998); whilst 
some factors may be inter-linked – for example the position of France, the ‘most 
reluctant state’ on the 1992 reform, was undermined when Germany joined the other 
‘large member state’, the UK. 
 
Vahl provides a useful starting-point for understanding the balance of power between 
Commission and member states in different reform negotiation contexts. In addition 
there is also the debate within and between member states. This will be influenced by 
many factors, of which we focus in this paper on two endogenous to the CAP and 
related to the distribution of the benefits from price support. As noted above, price 
support gives farmers an incentive to increase output. This affects their demand for 
inputs which will, in turn, affect their price. This is seen most clearly in the land 
market, where supply is inelastic and where not all farmers own the land they farm. 
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APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 6 
 
In a simple Ricardian model land is fixed in supply and has no value other than for 
agricultural production. The opportunity cost is zero and any return to land is simply 
rent. As Figure 6 shows, with fixed supply of land Q and demand for land D1, the 
equilibrium price of land is P1. Price support increases the demand for land, to D2, as 
the returns to agricultural production rise. The price of land thus rises to P2 and 
landowners have gained from price support. through an increase in wealth, simply by 
owning land. The rent they earn rises from area aqbP1 to aqcP2. 
 
If farmers are also landowners their wealth will have risen as the value of their assets 
rises along with the prices for their output. If, however, farmers are not landowners 
but tenants, they have to pay the landowner rent to farm the land; and rent is directly 
related to the price of land. As the later rises so does the former. Farmers appear to 
gain from higher product prices under price support, but they pay higher prices for 
their inputs – most dramatically so with land. In extremis, they might be no better off 
after the policy is enacted than before because of the impact of price support on input 
markets. It has been suggested that only 10% of price support goes to farmers in their 
capacity as farmers (OECD data, quoted in HM Treasury-DEFRA 2005, 12). The HM 
Treasury-DEFRA paper goes on to argue that direct payments are not much better, 
quoting studies that suggest only between 10% and 20% of coupled area payments 
were reaching farmers; the rest was getting capitalised into land prices which then 
also presents a barrier to entry for new entrants to farming. 
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One general observation is that extremely little empirical work has actually been done 
to determine the distribution of the benefits of CAP support from different policy 
instruments. In this regard the observations of Hill (2008, 14-17) are pertinent. 
Writing on the dearth of detailed statistics on the incomes of farming households, 
including incomes earned either off-farm or from non-farming activities, Hill offers 
several arguments why the demand for such data, seemingly central to the CAP in the 
light of Article 39, might be lacking. In particular Hill argues (page 16) that a clearer 
statistical picture might “undermine the general case for agricultural support.” 
 
Price support resulted in all farmers receiving support through high prices. Some 
countries received greater budgetary transfers as surpluses rose, driven by an increase 
in output from only some producers (the Commission estimated, in 1991, that 20% of 
farmers received 80% of support). This, in turn, established interests for and against 
the status quo. Unlike the general question of whether or not the CAP should be 
reformed this debate, constrained also by the pressures discussed in earlier sections, 
allowed the CAP to be reformed whilst CAP spending was maintained. Could the 
CAP be reformed, however, without undermining fundamentally the distribution of 
transfers? The reform described in Figure 4 managed largely to achieve this, as the 
value of the direct payments were based the depth of the price cuts. The distributional 
effects for most countries were, given the extent of the reform, remarkably modest 
(Ackrill et al 1998). 
 
As noted in the introduction to the paper, technical progress is an extant objective of 
the CAP along with farm income support. Figure 1 shows that price support increases 
the demand for productivity-improving technologies, and thus returns to innovation in 
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agribusiness. as Figure 6 describes, however, it is the owners of land (who may or 
may not farm) who benefit from the CAP price support system’s incentives to 
increase production. These distributional characteristics of the CAP created over time 
a constituency of landowners and agribusiness opposed to price cuts, alongside certain 
farmers and member states. Moreover even with changes to policy instruments, there 
has been continuity in the distribution of policy transfers. 
 
The paper identifies key shifts in the external and internal institutional context which 
mediates the budgetary and trade consequences of the CAP. In particular, the 
spillovers from the price support system come into conflict with the trade institutions 
introduced after the Uruguay Round and new EU budget management procedures 
after 1984. The conflicts and tensions between the trade and budget effects of the 
CAP and these new institutions have resulted in episodic EU crises, characterised by a 
widespread sense that ‘something had to be done’. This is one way of understanding 
the notion of binding pressures used in this paper. Importantly, however, we should 
avoid labelling these pressures as mechanical and deterministic. As set out in 
historical detail, even at the moments when the consequences of the CAP were 
creating grand pieces of political theatre in Brussels and elsewhere, reforms, though 
accommodating binding pressures, were still influenced by interests heavily invested 
in a CAP support system that has its roots in price support. 
 
Conclusions 
2008 marked fifty years of the Common Agricultural Policy. In the latter part of its 
first half-century, however, it has undergone significant change, in response to 
pressures largely endogenous to the principal support instrument chosen in 1958 – 
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price support. This created a policy that distorted trade and generated ever-growing 
budget costs. This paper has charted the development of these pressures for change 
alongside the institutional context of international trade and EU budgetary policies, 
for it is in the interaction of policy instruments and policy institutions that the timing 
of policy reforms is best understood. 
 
This is, however, only part of the story. Those same policy instruments also 
established a particular distribution of financial transfers that, in turn, created vested 
interests amongst both individuals and member states, for and against subsequent 
reform. Indeed, with price support affecting farmers’ demand for production and 
productivity-enhancing inputs, both the producers and owners of those inputs gained 
indirectly from the CAP. CAP reform is not, therefore, a simple deterministic process. 
The institutional context of different policy instruments was key to determining 
whether or not a reform pressure was binding, whilst the distribution of transfers and 
the interests vested in those transfers would result in bitter battles fought over the 
direction taken by the CAP. Indeed member states, individually and collectively, were 
central to the reform of the institutions of trade and budgetary policies during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Reforms to the EU budget placed an ever-tighter ceiling on total CAP spending, 
whilst reforms in the GATT constrained policies that distorted trade. Since 1992, CAP 
reforms have reflected these distinct pressures. Constraints have been imposed on the 
growth in CAP spending, whilst the distribution of that spending across farms of 
different sizes and activities has remained relatively stable: only the accession of ten 
new member states in 2004 has threatened the cross-member state distribution of 
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transfers. Furthermore, transfers are increasingly delivered through policy instruments 
that have de-coupled support from production. The CAP is increasingly targeting not 
only measures that reflect growing concerns over quality and safety, but supporting 
measures that go beyond agriculture to sustain the wider rural economy. The CAP has 
come a long way in its first fifty years. Ongoing budget and, especially, trade 
concerns suggest the story of mutual influence and antipathy is far from over, as 
reflected in the other papers in this Special Edition. 
 
 
                                                          
Notes 
1 Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, this is now Article 33.1. 
2 Strictly speaking the GATT had ‘Contracting Parties’ rather than ‘members’. 
3 Where a is the full rectangle between j and b. 
4 In 1988, for example, EC wheat and barley prices were 184% of the world price, for maize it was 
170%, for milk 215%, beef 203% and sugar 144%. 
5 Williams (1997) shows that after the dairy reform, the number of dairy farms dipped only in 1984/85 
and 1985/86, whilst income per farm rose throughout the 1980s, measured both in terms of net value 
added per farm at factor cost and net value added per annual work unit per farm at factor cost. 
6 The negative number reflects how the valuation of intervention stocks is accounted for. Stocks are 
sold onto third country markets at Pw – and the book value must be written-down to the expected sale 
price by the end of the year of purchase into intervention (with that sum paid from the EC budget to the 
member states). If the final selling price is above this the cost shows as a negative, as the member states 
must reimburse the EC budget the amount of the excess write-down. 
7 We now use this term as subsequent events occurred after the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty. 
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Figure 1: The Dynamic Effects of Price Support 
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Figure 2: Price Support With Production Quota 
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Figure 3: Total EU spending and CAP Guarantee spending, 1965-2006 (million 
units of common currency; percentage share) 
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Source: European Commission, 2006; own calculations. 
Note: Guarantee expenditures traditionally focused on income support measures. 
Since the 1999 reform, some rural development measures also fall under this heading. 
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Figure 4: Price Support and Direct Payments Compared 
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Figure 5: The Changing Structure of Total CAP Spending, 
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Sources: 
1986 – Court of Auditors Annual Report for 1986, OJC336, 15 December 1987, 
except ‘rural development’, from European Commission, Financial Report 2006; 
1992 – Court of Auditors Annual Report for 1992, OJC309, 16 November 1993, 
except ‘rural development’, from European Commission, Financial Report 2006; 
2006 – European Commission, Financial Report 2006. 
Note: 1986 and 1992 ‘Rural Development’ spending is actually agricultural 
‘structural’ expenditure, included for approximate comparative purposes. 
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Figure 6: A Simple Ricardian Model of the Land Market 
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